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Competent uses of competence: on the difference between a value-judgment 
and empirical assessability
Birgit Schaffar
Faculty of Education, Helsinki University, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT
This article considers the concept of Competence as applied to educational theory and policy, 
and illuminates the possibility of significant variations in meaning. Referring to Wittgenstein’s 
distinctions between transitive and intransitive uses of notions and Holland’s description of 
mastery, the article argues in favour of two senses in which someone can be described as 
being competent: i) as expressive of a value judgment; and ii) as pointing to a person’s (formal) 
qualifications. While the latter opens a path towards different forms of measurements of 
competence, being competent as a value judgment eludes any such treatment. Making this 
distinction, it is argued that competence is a less illuminative theoretical term than, for 
example, the pair of concepts Bildung versus Ausbildung ((self-)subjectivation vs training), 
that has been used in the Continental tradition in order to describe a similar distinction. With 
examples from educational contexts, the article demonstrates that the moment educational 
theory is using one word for two meanings, this central distinction in education is either 
concealed or forgotten. Focusing on competence purely as an empirically assessable notion 
risks playing into the hands of instrumentalising education.
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Discussions about educational policy, educational 
processes, efficiency, and comparative analyses have 
become increasingly global. Yet the desire to compare 
educational processes globally demands a high level 
of shared theoretical conceptions about what educa-
tion is, both in general and in detail, about what 
education aims for, and how it is organized in rela-
tion to other societal institutions. This has led to 
a growing theoretical awareness of different concep-
tual frameworks in quite distinct academic traditions, 
between national contexts and linguistic communities 
(Siljander et al., 2012; Uljens & Ylimaki, 2017). 
Besides other notions, Competence has been intro-
duced and explicitly promoted as a useful and neces-
sary concept to bridge the gap between different 
theoretical positions and to help articulate a shared 
ground for education (Illeris, 2013, p. 38; Koeppen 
et al., 2013, p. 171).
In the following, I want to go beyond the theore-
tical discussions of the past three decades in which 
scholars from different disciplines and with different 
purposes have tried to find and establish an accurate 
definition of the notion of competence (for an over-
view, see Schaffar, 2019). There, I have argued, that 
the confusion about how competence can and should 
be defined emerges from the notion’s various linguis-
tic, semantical and etymological roots. There are 
convincing arguments for both a broader under-
standing of the concept, and a more detailed appre-
ciation of it, so that even very different 
methodological approaches can be argued for in the 
discussion about competence.
Instead, I want to point towards a feature in the 
concept of competence that is relevant beyond the 
discussion about how to define it. I will argue that the 
same notion can have different meanings depending 
on how it is used, and in different contexts. Neither 
the meaning of a concept nor the significance of its 
relevant context are predefined, given or fixed. While 
this does not imply the possibility of randomly choos-
ing or stating what meaning a word has, it leaves 
room for individual and collective interpretation, 
judgment, negotiation or disagreement. What con-
cepts we choose to describe the circumstances of 
a situation also has a bearing on how the situation 
will be perceived; and vice versa, acting in a certain 
way may reveal a specific understanding of the con-
cept used, while other possible, meaningful implica-
tions are set aside (Hertzberg, 2001).
Referring to Wittgenstein’s distinctions between 
transitive and intransitive uses of notions 
(Wittgenstein, 1965) and Holland’s description of 
mastery (Holland, 1980), I assert two distinct inter-
pretations for someone as being competent depending 
on context: i) as expressive of a value-judgment; and 
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ii) as pointing to a person’s (formal) qualifications. 
While the latter opens a path towards different forms 
of measurements of competence, being competent as 
a value-judgment eludes any such treatment. Making 
this distinction, I argue that competence is a less 
illuminative theoretical term than, for example, the 
pair of concepts Bildung versus Ausbildung ((self-) 
subjectivation vs training), that has been used in the 
Continental tradition in order to describe the distinc-
tion between the evaluative judgment and strive for 
an ideal goal in education (Bildung), and the prag-
matic necessity of assessable outcomes in specific 
educational processes (Ausbildung). Using only one 
term for both meanings, there is the risk of displacing 
the meaning of being competent within the same 
theoretical texts and policy documents. One slips 
from competence as a value-judgment to speaking 
of it as a factual judgment. In philosophy, this type 
of mistake is commonly discussed as Hume’s guillo-
tine; we cannot derive statements of value or what 
ought to be from factual statements about what is.
With examples from educational contexts, 
I describe that the intransitive value-judgment of 
the notion is easily left aside. The moment educa-
tional theory begins using the same word for both 
terms, the central distinction in education between 
the value-laden aim of our educational endeavours, 
and what can be measured and assessed empirically is 
either concealed or forgotten. In this case, the focus 
on competence as an empirically assessable notion 
risks playing into the hands of instrumentalising 
education, for example, for neoliberal purposes and 
promotes non-democratic developments.
The ambiguity of the notion of competence
During the last 20–30 years, an immense volume of 
literature has emerged that seeks to define what com-
petence is, how it is structured, and how it can be 
developed and assessed (Schaffar, 2019). It can be 
seen that the notion of competence has a complex 
structure of different meanings, both in different 
languages and within the same language (Allais, 
2014; Brockmann et al., 2008), that can be traced 
back through a long etymological history of the 
word (Schaffar, 2019). Very roughly, one can say 
that today’s German, French and Dutch notions of 
Kompetenz, compétence or competentie are used in 
a broad, generic sense, while the English word com-
petence describes an individual’s abilities in a rather 
narrow, technical sense (Cedefop, 2009, pp. 19–20). 
In English, the notion of expertise is used when refer-
ring to a person’s broad capacity, for example, for 
high performance as a professional (Addis & Winch, 
2017, p. 558). Despite these general linguistic aspects, 
the global discussion about educational policy and 
theory has over time led to a spectrum of uses and 
meanings of central notions. Allais (2014) points out 
that sometimes different notions, for example, com-
petence, learning outcome and qualification, are trea-
ted as distinct from each other, but that just as often 
they are used synonymously (Allais, 2014, p.xxvi).
Depending on the perspective one wishes to take, 
we can say that we either see an openness in, or 
a confusion about, what central educational concep-
tions like competence mean and what role this notion 
should play in the global educational discussion. In 
their study The shift to learning outcome. Policies and 
practices in Europe (Cedefop, 2009), Cedefop tries for 
example, to ‘address the need to create bridges 
between different parts of the educational and train-
ing system’, and therefore wants to introduce 
a common language that would make it easier to 
communicate (Cedefop, 2009, p. 1). After a closer 
conceptual examination, they come to the conclusion 
the ‘problem is that the term competence (as well as 
competences and competencies) lacks a clear, stan-
dard meaning both in the English language and 
across European language traditions. Once we intro-
duce the term competence, definitions become fuzzy 
at best, and there is no way to place a single discipline 
or definition on it’ (Cedefop, 2009, p. 18).
While Cedefop prefers to use the notion learning 
outcome in their studies and policy-documents, we 
find elsewhere, studies that explicitly promote compe-
tence as the notion that will serve as common ground. 
Koeppen et al. (2013), for example, write in their 
description of a six-year ‘priority program’ on 
Competence models for assessing individual learning 
outcomes and evaluating educational processes, 
financed by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) that several international large-scale assess-
ments ‘have recently drawn increased public and 
scientific attention to educational outcomes and 
their assessment’. This has led to ‘an increasing 
focus within educational systems on defining and 
evaluating the goals to be attained by schools. In 
many cases, however, adequate assessment proce-
dures are still lacking as are procedures for analysing 
and reporting the results’. In order to respond to this 
theoretical and methodological deficit, they point out 
that ‘the concept of competence is increasingly con-
sidered as an anchor point in this discussion’ 
(Koeppen et al., 2013, p. 171, my emphasis).
From yet another angle, Han also attributes the 
notion of competence as having a central role in 
today’s educational discussion when he calls com-
petence the ‘new DNA in the world of education’ 
(Han, 2009, p. 57). In a chapter on competence as 
a commodification of human ability, he writes: ‘The 
dominant force of the societal learning system has 
been slowly relocated from the arena of state poli-
tics to that of market exchangeability. [. . .] The 
game of education and the game of economics had 
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been clearly distinguished, linked only with blurry 
connections for school to work transition, at least 
until neoliberal social politics swept the world of 
social policies from the 1990s’. Han says that major 
social policies including education, medical services, 
and social welfare ‘were redirected to fit into this 
framework’ under this new trend. Especially, the 
education sector was ‘heavily targeted to reformu-
late a new learning market as a major carrier of the 
emerging knowledge economy’. He points out that 
the ‘notion of competence in this context had the 
spotlight’ (Han, 2009, p. 65).
These diverging discussions of competence paint 
an ambiguous and confusing picture. On the one 
hand, we find several scholars who criticize the 
notion of competence for being used in an inflation-
ary manner (e.g. Granberg, 2009, p. 104; Späte, 2011; 
Ott, 2010) and who show awareness of the risk that 
without a uniform definition researchers tend to fol-
low ‘their own approaches in defining and classifying 
competence in line with their respective research 
tradition’ (Haasler & Erpenbeck, 2008, p. 766). On 
the other hand, there might not be any other phe-
nomenon in the social sciences that garners as much 
attention as competence in the development of instru-
ments for measuring outcomes of educational pro-
cesses (Cortina, 2016, p. 30).
While this confusion is commonly seen as the 
result of insufficient stipulations about what compe-
tence is, I want to leave the search for clarity of 
definition aside, and rather look for perspicuity in 
how differently a notion such as ‘competence’ can be 
used in one and the same text and line of thought. 
This will help to analyse the source of this ambiguity 
and shed light on central distinctions within our 
common, and more theoretical, understanding of 
what is central in education, and to discern how 
these play out in discussions of what it is to be 
competent.
‘Being competent’ as a transitive and 
intransitive notion
To the later Wittgenstein many of our philosophical 
problems about grasping the meaning of words ori-
ginate in a failure to make clear to ourselves how 
those words are used in everyday language (cf 
Agam-Segal, 2018). Thus, he often reminds us of 
a possible gap between how we are initially inclined 
to define a word in our philosophical thinking – 
what we want something to mean – and the mean-
ing of a word as it emerges in its actual use in 
language. One such distinction that he returns to 
in several discussions, is the distinction between 
transitive and intransitive uses of a word 
(Wittgenstein, 1965). He borrows this distinction 
from linguistics, but applies it in a broad way to 
clarify not only a rather superficial grammatical 
difference, but to show the constitutive role our 
ways of speaking about something have for our 
understanding of what kind of object it is.
Some verbs can be used with or without an object, 
for example, thinking or waiting; I am thinking 
(intransitive) versus I am thinking of something 
(transitive), or he is waiting (intransitive) versus he 
is waiting for X to happen (transitive). In these cases, 
we use the same verb, but the predicate is different. 
Wittgenstein expounds the importance of this differ-
ence in relation to understanding the concepts in 
question (Wittgenstein, 1965). In this article, I will 
use Wittgenstein’s distinction as a reminder that 
allows me to analyse the way we speak and theorize 
about competence. I will not provide an exegetical 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s work on related notions, 
such as ability, learning, or knowledge.
If we apply the distinction between transitive and 
intransitive uses to the notion of being competent, we 
can see a similar structure, although, unlike 
Wittgenstein’s examples, being competent is not 
a verb. This difference between a transitive and 
intransitive use of being competent is not as apparent 
as in the cases of thinking and waiting where we can 
see the different predicate directly (x is thinking ver-
sus x is thinking of something). Rather, ‘She is defi-
nitely competent’ might be uttered in a meeting when 
choosing someone for a certain job. The difference 
will be in the way the predicate being competent is 
used. ‘She is definitely competent’ could refer to the 
formal papers that are required for the job that con-
firm, attest and verify the competence that she pos-
sesses. This would be a transitive use. On the other 
hand, we could imagine that she has just left the 
room after her interview and one of the interview 
panel utters spontaneously, ‘She is definitely compe-
tent’. In this case, being competent is used in an 
intransitive way. It is an expression of appreciation 
rather than a reference to her portfolio with all the 
formally required papers.
On the surface, the sentence ‘She is competent’ has 
the same grammatical structure in both cases, but 
looking at the way in which the sentence is being 
used, being competent has two different propositional 
contents. When used in a transitive way, it takes the 
form of a factual proposition – the interviewee is 
holding a certain set of competencies (the object in 
the transitive use). These competences have been 
achieved, measured and confirmed in a formalized 
situation. The intransitive use, however, is not point-
ing to something specific in the person’s knowledge, 
that is, there is nothing, no object that one could 
point towards – it is rather a judgment of value 
regarding the person as a whole.
Think, for example, of situations where two for-
mally competent individuals are compared in relation 
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to their performance of a certain task. Both might get 
the job done, but only the latter is doing it in a way 
that satisfies the customer, that is, both are competent 
but only the second one in a transitive as well as an 
intransitive sense.
Being competent in the sense of this second person 
might remind us of Hilary Putnam’s discussion of 
thick concepts (Putnam, 2002). It is possible to think 
of the words ‘S/he is competent’ as both descriptions 
and evaluations at the same time, and of the attribu-
tion of competence to someone as entangled with the 
evaluation of this as something to recommend 
(Putnam, 2002). Here, the case of this second person, 
who is competent in both the transitive and intransi-
tive sense seems to follow the attributions of generos-
ity and cruelty to an individual. The description of 
someone as generous or cruel depends for its sense on 
understanding these features of their behaviour as 
something that is valued as good or bad (Putnam, 
2002), as behaviour we can or cannot recommend. 
However, as seen in the case of the first person, there 
are uses of competence where the factual descriptions 
of someone having the formal competences for 
a position can be disentangled from the evaluative 
judgment that the person is someone, the person 
making the judgment, would recommend. 
Therefore, I do not want to argue that the factual 
and the evaluative are always entangled, as one would 
do in calling competence a thick concept in Putnam’s 
description of it.1
These discussions remind us that the distinction 
between transitive and intransitive uses contains the 
well-known difficulty of how judgements of value and 
propositions of facts are related to each other. As it is 
often argued throughout the history of philosophy, it 
is problematic to try to describe value judgements as 
a series of factual propositions. Holland, who is fol-
lowing Wittgenstein’s line of thought, argues in his 
essays: Against empiricism (Holland, 1980) that 
appreciating someone for being competent as 
a whole, as formulated above, can easily be misunder-
stood in a factual way. But the whole is not a list of 
everything that can be known and done; it is not 
a reference to something complete. It is rather, what 
Holland describes as mastery, an open-ended con-
cept. ‘What it focuses upon is an ideal and not an 
actual resting place’ (Holland, 1980, p. 56). According 
to Holland, mastery, and in our case the intransitive 
meaning of competence,
is an achievement that never annihilates the task. It is 
a finding in which an essential part of what is found 
is that there is more to seek. The reason why mastery 
has this property is that the achievement is not 
external to the task. Hence that combination of 
unbowing independence with humility towards the 
subject which noticeably characterises the mastery. 
(Holland,1980, p. 56). 
In a related essay: Education and the spirit, Holland 
further develops the idea that when we are describing 
someone as doing something with spirit, we are 
obviously uttering ‘judgements of value’ (Holland, 
1980, p. 63). But, he stresses, spirit should not be 
taken ‘to be the name of a class of invisible sub-
stances’ (Holland, 1980, 63–64). Rather, it is ‘non- 
discursive’ or ‘non-theoretical’, by which he means 
that it is
unformulatable in discourse of the kind which by 
a series of statements expounds a subject in an item-
ising, orderly, argumentative way. One could equally 
use the term non-propositional, especially in so far as 
one thinks of propositions as vehicles of factuality, 
bald specifications of states of affairs. (Holland, 
1980, p. 64) 
In this quotation, Holland provides his version of 
Hume’s guillotine, the notion that judgements of 
value cannot be derived from judgements of facts. 
He can also be seen as spelling out the implications 
of Wittgenstein’s distinction between transitive and 
intransitive uses of concepts. The gist of these argu-
ments is that the uses of a notion as a value-judgment 
cannot be reduced to a set of factual propositions, 
even if it would be a very complex set of propositions.
Throughout the history of knowledge and educa-
tion, we find sophisticated descriptions and analyses 
on this distinction. In education for example, the 
Continental tradition has distinguished between the 
notions of Bildung and Ausbildung in order to be able 
to communicate this central difference (Schaffar and 
Uljens, 2015). Bildung could be described in 
Holland’s words as the strive for the ideal of mastery, 
‘an achievement that never annihilates the task’, an 
ongoing movement of searching just in order to find 
that ‘an essential part of what is found is that there is 
more to seek’. However, the Continental tradition 
was at the same time aware of the pragmatic necessity 
in educational processes, and distinguished the strive 
for Bildung from discussion about when educational 
relationships and processes should come to an end, 
what (assessable) level of knowledge and skills are 
required in order to receive an exam and to be called 
qualified for certain civic and professional tasks in 
society. Here, the notion of Ausbildung was used. 
With two distinct terms, it is feasible to keep apart 
these different foci in educational theory and practice 
(cf Horlacher, 2015, p. 123).
Still, by using the notion of competence, educa-
tional theory and policy is able to refer to both, the 
overarching, never-ending strive towards an ideal, 
and the search for pragmatic solutions for concrete 
educational processes. It is not surprising that in the 
discussion about competence, we find voices who 
recognize the problems involved in reducing intran-
sitive uses of competence, which in our case imply 
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a value-judgment, to transitive, factual propositions, 
as well as those voices that describe and handle the 
situation by just asserting the immense complexity of 
competence, but still suggest that this complexity can 
be captured in factual propositions.
From one voice, we find Illeris, 2013, who 
describes difficulties of assessing some features of 
competence that rather belong to generic compe-
tences (creativity, problem-solving, flexibility, person-
ality or attitudes). Without referring to distinctions 
like those between transitive versus intransitive, or 
value-judgements versus factual propositions, he 
points out that ‘a complete assessment of competen-
cies is not possible’ (Illeris, 2013, 137, my transla-
tion); assessments of someone’s real competence, that 
is, what s/he is able to do in a certain situation, 
should always be understood ‘as assessments of just 
limited parts and elements of competence’ (Illeris, 
2013, 137).
Among other voices, however, we find the metho-
dological discussions of how to assess and empirically 
measure competence, for example, in regard to the 
increasing amount of large-scale national and inter-
national assessments (cf TIMSS, PISA, IALS, ALL).2 
Here, measuring competence is treated as very com-
plex and multilayered, but in principle still 
a manageable, empirical task. Koeppen et al. (2013), 
for example, write ‘The new focus on competence has 
shifted attention from the measurement of general 
cognitive abilities to more complex ability constructs 
related to real world contexts. Sophisticated models 
of the structure and levels of these complex con-
structs need to be developed’ (Koeppen et al., 2013, 
p. 171); or ‘The difficulties and complexities of asses-
sing learners’ baseline competencies and learning 
gains are often underestimated in educational policy 
and practice. Developing appropriate measurement 
instruments that can be used for different purposes 
is a time- and resource-intensive undertaking’ 
(Koeppen et al., 2013, p. 172). In these quotations, 
competence is seen as something that in principle can 
be described by a complex set of measurable features. 
What follows in the educational literature after 
descriptions like this are detailed discussions about 
different theoretical definitions and models, and 
about the validity and reliability of different psycho-
metric tests and scales. But the willingness to measure 
competence at any price disguises the central pro-
blem, namely that an open-ended concept like 
Holland’s description of mastery, or the intransitive 
use of being competent, cannot be translated into 
empirically measurable units.
Wittgenstein’s point in bringing out the distinc-
tion between the transitive and intransitive use is not 
to put one over the other, but to alert us to the 
difference in use that changes the meaning of the 
word in a concrete case. The same awareness can be 
accomplished when using two different words in 
order to keep the two necessarily different discussions 
apart. While the intransitive use as a value-judgment 
cannot be reduced to empirical propositions, the 
transitive use invites us to use the concept in just 
such a way. The problem I want to highlight in the 
following section is that when the same word is used 
for these very different educational meanings, the 
central distinction between what is empirically mea-
surable and what is not, becomes invisible.
From value-judgements to factual statements
Wittgenstein’s discussion of transitive and intransi-
tive uses calls attention to the possibility of theoretical 
imprecision, that might cause confusion and misun-
derstanding when used in the global discussion about 
educational goals and measurements. At its worst, it 
enables the possibility of rhetorically misleading nar-
ratives in current educational discussions.
Intransitive formulations are often mistaken as just 
less accurate expressions of seemingly similar transi-
tive applications. Wittgenstein discusses, for example, 
the transitive and intransitive differences between 
longing, waiting, wishing, being afraid, and so on, 
and writes that there is a temptation to conceal the 
differences between transitive and intransitive uses by 
saying, ‘The difference between the two cases is sim-
ply that in one case we know what we are longing for 
and in the other we don’t’ (Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 29). 
But, as he continues, the expression ‘I am longing’ is 
neither the same as ‘I am longing, but do not know 
what I am longing for’, nor ‘I am longing, but not for 
something specific’ (cf Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 30). The 
same can be seen in the discussion above. The value- 
judgment that is involved in someone being competent 
cannot be completely translated into a list of detailed 
factual propositions. With these inaccurate transla-
tions from intransitive to transitive forms, the intran-
sitive use risks being pushed to the background in 
favour of the seemingly more detailed and precise 
transitive descriptions (Agam-Segal, 2018; 
Wittgenstein, 1965). Let us keep this risk in mind 
and have a closer look at how the notion of compe-
tence is used in two examples.
As sketched above, the notion of competence has 
been presented and promoted as a possible core 
notion for educational theory and policy since the 
early 1990s. Earlier notions like knowledge, ability, 
qualification or, as mentioned, the Continental 
notion of Bildung have become increasingly sidelined 
(Horlacher, 2015, p. 124). It is interesting to take 
a closer look at how competence is introduced and 
argued for as a necessary notion precisely for our 
time.
Knut Illeris, for example, has written extensively 
on competence. In numerous texts, he writes that 
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competence refers to a person’s broad capabilities, 
something that is increasingly needed in ‘this mod-
ern, ever-changing world’. This is why it is ‘a modern 
expression’ for what a person is actually able to do or 
to achieve (Illeris, 2009, p. 83). Illeris applies the 
following definition:
The concept of competence refers [. . .] to a person 
being qualified in a broader sense. It is not merely 
that a person masters a professional area, but also 
that the person can apply this professional knowl-
edge – and more than that, apply it in relation to the 
requirements inherent in a situation which, in addi-
tion may be uncertain and unpredictable. Thus, 
competence also includes the person’s assessments 
and attitudes, and ability to draw on a considerable 
part of his/her personal qualifications. (Illeris, 
2009, p. 84) 
Illeris emphasizes that the importance and appeal of 
the notion lies in the insight that it ‘involves the 
ability to deal appropriately with future and unfore-
seen situations. [. . .] The ability to immediately make 
the professionally proper judgements and decisions in 
all new situations that constantly arise in working life’ 
is the crucial quality of a competency (Illeris, 
2009, p. 84).
Illeris begins his account of competence by 
describing it as a notion relating to very high expec-
tations. Someone who is able to appropriately deal 
with any kind of future situation by making profes-
sionally proper judgements and decisions is beyond 
any possible critique. This description relies essen-
tially on value judgements. Competence is not only 
about being able to deal with future complex situa-
tions, but to deal with these situations appropriately. 
Or, in other words, the assessment is not only about 
making judgements and decisions, but about being 
able to judge and decide in a professionally proper 
way. It is Holland’s notion of the open-ended mas-
tery – ‘an ideal and not an actual resting place’ – that 
Illeris aims for in his definition of competence. Here, 
being competent is used in an intransitive way.3
The first step in introducing the notion as the 
one needed for today’s educational discussions, 
therefore, is to describe competence as an ideal 
everyone is to approve of and to affirm as the 
ultimate aim for any educational endeavour. No 
educational theory, no educational policy maker or 
practising teacher can possibly have objections 
against this description as worth striving for. 
Already in 2003, Bramming critically noticed that 
competence is ‘a plus-word’, a word that can only be 
understood in a positive way. ‘We cannot imagine 
a person, a company or a public institution that 
seriously would say “Development of competence, 
no thanks – I know enough” or “We will have no 
use for competent employees in the future”’ 
(Brammig, 2003, p. 18, my translation). Quite 
correctly, she notices that it is not possible to 
argue for a reasonable point of view opposed to 
this. That means, at this stage of the discussion, 
the reader is already entangled in the argument; it 
is competent people that our society needs, that our 
educational institutions should strive for and that 
our academic educational discussions should pro-
vide the means for.
In principle, the same goes for the notion of 
Bildung, as described above. It is a plus-word by 
which we indicate the goal to strive for. Still, 
a difference from the notion of competence is that 
discussions about the need to strive for Bildung were 
easier to maintain as questions with open answers, 
due to its distinction from the pragmatic discussions 
about Ausbildung.
In presenting competence as the notion that is 
needed in our societies today, the step that follows 
is crucial. From this unquestionable value-description 
of competence, the next questions to appear in 
a theoretical and public policy debate are about com-
petence in the transitive sense. If competence is what 
we need today, then the question is what precisely 
should be done to reach competence for as many 
people as possible in society? What follows are ana-
lyses and discussions about what competence is in 
detail, that is, the discussion shifts to the transitive 
use of being competent as holding a set of competences.
In Illeris’ and many other theorists’ cases, we find 
at this stage of the presentation a thorough discussion 
about how precisely competence is internally struc-
tured, and an analysis of its different components 
(Illeris, 2013). Theorists distinguish between different 
competences (now in plural), which leads to ques-
tions of their internal relationship and hierarchy (e.g. 
generic competences vs specific competences). 
Further, it is analysed how to enable the most effec-
tive learning process for the desired competencies 
through different arrangements in school-settings as, 
according to the above presented goal, our shared 
interest is to guarantee the existence, emergence and 
stability of competence.
These are all important questions, but they differ 
in character from the intransitive use. It is 
Ausbildung that is investigated, when being compe-
tent is understood as a (complex) set of items, and 
not as a person’s quality. It is the attempt to ‘itemise 
the unformulatable into a series of statements’ 
(Holland), and for this purpose the concept in ques-
tion has to be imagined as consisting of factual prop-
erties. As a concept that refers to a set of items, 
questions and discussions about their factual proper-
ties are now understandable and meaningful to pose. 
The concept of being competent is used in a transitive 
way, and thus its meaning has changed. Now it is 
meaningful to ask how being competent could be 
attested, defined, assessed, measured and compared, 
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that is, how it could be empirically assessed. Being 
competent has received a ‘resting place’ (Holland), 
while the intransitive, open-ended meaning of the 
concept at the beginning of the argument is always 
dynamic and never fixed.
Illeris describes this problem explicitly, when he 
writes that we ‘have to take it very seriously that 
quantifications and comparisons of these measure-
ments inevitably leads to prioritizing those assessable 
elements at the expense of what is not measurable. 
This again leads to a one-sidedness that the notion of 
competence precisely wanted to overcome’ (Illeris, 
2013, p. 137, my translation).
Still, it is not enough to mention this risk. We have 
to understand the conceptual structure of the notion 
being competent that allows us to use the same word 
to mean both the value-judgment and the assessable 
factual statement depending on the different contexts 
of our argument in order to prevent the domination 
of transitive use.
Another example of the possibility of silently shift-
ing between intransitive value-judgements and tran-
sitive factual assessments can be seen in the 
articulation of the urgent need for the project that 
Koeppen et al. suggest. Here, the shift between 
intransitive and transitive uses is not as obvious as 
in Illeris’ case. Rather, their argument that we need 
more sophisticated models and tools for competence 
assessment is made via a constant pointing towards 
the intransitive meaning of competence without spel-
ling out, as Illeris did, the details of what this implies. 
For example, they start their article by stating ‘Social 
change, social cohesion, and opportunities for social 
development are all dependent on the educational 
level of the members of a society’ and continue by 
underlining the problem that the results of large-scale 
international assessments, have ‘identified huge gaps 
between the competencies attained, on one hand, and 
the goals of the educational system, on the other’ 
Further: ‘There has been an increasing focus within 
educational systems on defining and evaluating the 
goals to be attained by schools’. (Koeppen et al., 2013, 
p. 171). In these quotations, they acknowledge 
a distinction to be made between attained competen-
cies and the goal of educational systems as such, and 
state that ‘the concept of competence is increasingly 
considered as an anchor point in this discussion’ 
(Koeppen et al., 2013, p. 171, my emphasis).
It might not be as explicit as in Illeris’ case whether 
they are referring only to specific measurable cogni-
tive goals in relation to specific school-related tasks 
when they talk about competence or to wider societal 
questions and phenomenon. But the relevance of 
their project relies on the immediate link between 
the measurability of competence that they aim to 
develop and competence as the central indicator for 
societal enhancement. These (assumingly) valuable 
strives for social change, social cohesion and opportu-
nities for social development indicate that the intran-
sitive use of competence is at work when ‘Current 
discussions in educational research emphasise the 
importance of the products of educational processes’ 
(Koeppen et al., 2013, p. 171). In their formulations, 
they essentially build on value-laden goals, but give 
the impression that the solution will be found in 
a sophisticated model of competence and a complex 
measurement tool-box.
These examples illustrate, that the notion of com-
petence enables us to blur a central distinction in 
educational theory, viz the distinction between what 
the value-laden aims of our endeavours in education 
are, and what can be measured and assessed empiri-
cally. On the surface, we are using the same words, 
but the meaning of them is shifting depending on the 
context of argument and discussion. Both uses are 
meaningful and necessary in educational discussions, 
but it is important to keep their characteristics dis-
tinct. As Gert Biesta puts it: ‘It is always advisable to 
use factual information when making decisions about 
what ought to be done, [but] (my insertion) what 
ought to be done can never be logically derived 
from what is the case’ (Biesta, 2010, p. 12). By con-
flating both uses, the risk is we present the transitive 
use as a solution to specific intransitive aims, and 
without further notice, the value-laden and not- 
measurable meaning of competence is set aside or 
forgotten.
Further consequences
Wittgenstein’s interest in elucidating the difference 
between transitive and intransitive use is mainly phi-
losophical or conceptual. It is, however, important to 
recognize that the blurring of this central distinction 
in education is not only a theoretical failure of char-
acterizing the different uses of the concept correctly. 
While on the surface, the notion of competence 
might seem to bridge a gap between different theore-
tical schools and educational cultures, neglecting the 
possibility of this dual use rather conceals the central 
educational distinction between what the value-laden 
aim of our educational endeavours is, and what can 
be measured and assessed empirically. This might not 
have caused, but has at least tolerated confusions and 
misunderstandings in the public, political and profes-
sional discussion of education, which in some cases 
might explain why the notion has become so popular, 
despite – or maybe even because of its lack of theo-
retical accuracy.
For example, it has been widely analysed and 
argued that neoliberal shifts in national and interna-
tional policy making forces education increasingly 
into a new self-conception (Ball, 2012; cf Dovemark 
et al., 2018; Parreira do Amaral et al., 2019). At its 
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core, education is pushed into the logic of economic 
phenomenon, a logic that is fundamentally based on 
a transitive understanding of competence. Han points 
out, that it was through the discipline of Human 
Resource Development (HRD) that the concept of 
competence gained attention in the educational 
realm, through the reduction of the intransitive use 
to the transitive. He writes,
While HRD investigates the nature of human experi-
ence and its maxim development, human competence 
is a “displayed characteristic of expertise, not the 
expertise itself, but very behaviour-specific, defin-
able, and measurable subsets within an individual’s 
domain of expertise”. [. . .] If considering that current 
HRD presupposes capitalism and market system as 
fundamentals, the characteristics of competence 
interpreted as the measurable, the definable, and the 
manageable are directly linked with monetary forms 
of marketable goods or human capital in a capitalist 
society. (Han, 2009, p. 58) 
In the logic of capitalist economic processes, educa-
tion is taken to be similar to most other production 
processes. Since only measurable, assessable units, 
processes and outcomes, are tradable, it is only 
those parts of our educational discussion that are 
seen as relevant in a dominant capitalist view of 
education. Here, the transitive use of competence is 
in focus when competences are imagined and con-
ceptualized as something that can be given a price, 
can be traded, owned, bought or sold. The intransi-
tive use of competence (or the perspective of Bildung) 
is falling out of sight, and literally losing its value, as 
it is the perspective on education that cannot be 
nailed down to factual propositions. Consequently, 
because it is not available as an object for monetary 
evaluations, the intransitive perspective appears to be 
not valuable, not useful and thus not at all worthy of 
consideration.
The possibility of treating the notion of being 
competent as a set of items with definable and mea-
surable (factual) features, and with comparable, asses-
sable and manageable smaller units (competences), 
while at the same time still echoing a desirable over-
arching goal in society, might have been an important 
factor in facilitating the commodification of compe-
tences. The notion of competence might not have 
caused this development, but the lack of theoretical 
accuracy and precision has at least not helped to 
restrain the growing one-sidedness of the educational 
discourse. The use of two distinct notions, like the 
concepts of Bildung and Ausbildung, might have 
helped to highlight that the commodification of edu-
cation is only focusing on the assessable, pragmatic 
questions about education.
Gert Biesta’s book Good Education in an Age of 
Measurement (Biesta, 2010) reminds of yet another 
problem that is related to the imprecision of the 
notion of competence. Although he is not directly 
discussing the notion of competence, his main analy-
tical line of thought is the relation between discus-
sions about quality on one hand and what is 
measurable on the other. He describes education as 
a process with a direction and purpose, which makes 
it necessary to constantly pose the question about 
quality, what education actually is for, and what we 
mean by aiming for good education. But, he writes:
The problem is not only that the question of good 
education seems to have disappeared. I also believe 
that in many cases the question of good education 
has been replaced by other discourses. Such dis-
courses often appear to be about the quality of edu-
cation – think, for example, of discussions about the 
effectiveness of education or on accountability in 
education – but in fact never address the question 
of good education itself. They rather displace the 
normative question of good education with technical 
and managerial questions about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of processes, not what these processes 
are supposed to be for. (Biesta, 2010, p. 2) 
Despite those voices who explicitly presented compe-
tence as the salving notion in our struggle to com-
municate beyond different educational and cultural 
traditions, his diagnosis of the current problem is 
rather that ‘If there is anything lacking [. . .] it is 
first and foremost a language or vocabulary that 
allows us to articulate questions about the purpose 
of education and to do so in a precise enough man-
ner’ (Biesta, 2010, p. 4, my emphasis). Biesta criticizes 
today’s educational theory for not being able to 
express this central strive for good education as an 
ideal or quality in itself, as it was indicated by the 
notion of Bildung. Instead, the discussion about qual-
ity has shifted and focusses on quality-control of 
educational process and their outcomes, like it is 
possible to do in discussions about Ausbildung.4
Biesta links this development to an even deeper 
problem. The moment we are narrowing the discus-
sion about quality in education to an issue of quality- 
controlling educational processes, it risks being 
understood as a question for experts to find solution 
to, rather than a central question for a democratic 
public to engage in. Questions about the aims and 
goals for educating the next generation has always 
been one of the central tasks for public debate and 
consideration in democratic societies. What is worth 
knowing and passing on, what should be improved in 
society, in short: how do we want our society to be in 
the future, are central democratic, evaluative ques-
tions. However, as can be seen in large-scale assess-
ments, it is assumed to be possible to compare the 
academic achievements of a certain cohort in any 
country despite the differences between cultural and 
historical peculiarities and their national curricula, 
for example, OECD’s PISA Programme. The need to 
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be alert to the specific cultural discussions about 
what is seen as important and valuable to strive for 
in education (as the intransitive use of competence or 
the term Bildung essentially depend on), is elimi-
nated as much as possible in the scope of these 
assessments.
On one hand this is possible, due to the 
unquestionable aim of competent people as the 
ultimate outcome of our shared educational 
endeavours. Compare for example, OECD’s first 
report on the PISA results, which was called 
Knowledge and Skills for Life. The foreword is 
asking: ‘Are students well prepared to meet the 
challenges of the future? Are they able to analyse, 
reason and communicate their ideas effectively? 
Do they have the capacity to continue learning 
throughout life?’ (OECD, 2001, p. 3). These are 
broad and highly valued educational aims that are 
hard to question – at least at first sight. Here, the 
intransitive use seems to help overcome different 
national traditions and cultures and to establish 
a global vocabulary for discussion.
But on the other hand, this runs the risk of a loss 
of democratic involvement in educational questions. 
When the aim of education is conceived as unques-
tionable and obvious, what is there left to discuss for 
the public community? This possible shift in mean-
ing, described above, invites us to think that what 
remains to be done is up to educational experts to 
manage, plan, conduct, assess and improve the edu-
cational processes, that is, to focus on the transitive 
meaning of competence. In this respect, the foreword 
to the first PISA report continues interestingly by 
stating that ‘Parents, students, the public and those 
who run education systems need to know the answers 
to these questions’ (OECD, 2001, p. 3). Here, the 
democratic public is addressed as passive in relation 
to the debate; in need of (and having the right) to 
know, they are waiting for the experts to answer the 
questions about the educational future, for example, 
by comparing the achievements in reading, mathe-
matical and scientific literacy of 15-year olds in sev-
eral countries. Biesta writes: ‘Those who should be 
involved in discussions about what constituted good 
education – such as teachers, parents, students and 
society as a whole – [are precluded] (my insertion) 
from taking part in them’ (Biesta, 2010, p. 2). 
Discussions about the aims of education are increas-
ingly transferred to experts who, as argued above, 
often rather confuse the question about good educa-
tion (i.e. about value judgements) by asserting how 
elusive and complex learning and assessment pro-
cesses are. Education as a democratic endeavour and 
a shared engagement in value-discussions (Bildung) 
is at risk in favour of education as a learning-process 
controlled and operated by experts only 
(Ausbildung).
Conclusion
Given that theoretical considerations and terms 
should illuminate our understanding of the phenom-
enon in question, and should provide analytical tools 
to better understand the challenges as well as offer 
a language that helps us to communicate with each 
other to prevent possible misunderstanding, 
Competence must be considered a weak concept for 
educational theory and policy. At first sight, we might 
say that educational policy is about translating com-
plex value-laden ideals to practical guidelines and this 
is precisely what could be achieved by the term com-
petence. But the translation from the value-laden 
ideal into pragmatic solutions is crucial and should 
be done as informed as possible. With reference to 
the pair of concepts Bildung – Ausbildung, that is 
used in the Continental educational tradition in order 
to name the two distinct foci in educational discus-
sions, I argue that both perspectives are necessary to 
be aware of. Using the same word for both sides of 
the translation-process is rather confusing than illu-
minating the discussion. While theoretical concepts 
should help us to understand the complexity in edu-
cational questions, the notion of competence, with its 
varying uses, enables us to blur one of the central 
distinctions in educational discussions.
Notes
1. As will be demonstrated in the next sections, I aim to 
show problems in discussions about competence arise 
because there are situations where the factual judg-
ment can be disentangled from the evaluative judg-
ment. Therein different problems are possible. We can 
think the evaluative judgment can be replaced by the 
making of (a complex set of) factual judgements. Or 
we do not recognize that the evaluative judgements are 
never fully reducible to the factual descriptions, 
although we in some situations can explicate what is 
of value to us in statements that can be considered as 
statements of fact. These are problems that arise when 
we, as Wittgenstein says, become ‘entangled in our 
own rules’ (Wittgenstein, 1953/2020, § 125).
2. TIMSS: Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study; PISA: Programme for International 
Student Assessment; IALS: International Adult 
Literacy Survey; ALL: Accessible Literacy Learning.
3. It is interesting to notice that Illeris is criticizing the 
notion of Bildung as not appropriate for today’s needs 
(Illeris, 2013, p. 21). At the same time his description 
of competence is very much precisely what was meant 
by Bildung as well.
4. For a similar analysis and argument in the field of 
health care, see Bornemark 2018.
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